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The fact that our conclusion should include an out-of-home burglary, even if explicit danger factors are not present in Fiore, is demonstrated by the context of Taylor`s quoted language.   In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to determine the meaning of the word “burglary” as used in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which provides harsher penalties for persons with certain types of criminal records in a manner similar to the criminal direction at issue in this case. including a “violent crime”. 3 The term “violent crime” is defined and includes “burglary”.   In its opinion, the Court rejected the view that ACCA understood “burglary” as a specific subcategory of burglary, such as those that meet the common law definition,4 and instead adopted a “contemporary generic meaning,” 495 U.S. at 598, 110 p.C. 2143.   This definition includes any “unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building or structure with intent to commit a criminal offence.”  Id. at 599, 110 pp.

Ct. 2143. However, contrary to the Court`s view, there may be cases in which the imposition of the death penalty would constitute a manifest error of justice, even if the accused remains liable to the death penalty. For example, if the convicted person relied heavily on the finding that the accused had severely tortured the victim when the death penalty was imposed, but it is later established that another person was responsible for the torture, the removal of the aggravating circumstance will indicate in some cases that the death penalty was a miscarriage of justice. By introducing an all-or-nothing test, the Court`s definition of “innocence of the death penalty” ignores this important possibility. These sample phrases are automatically selected from various online information sources to reflect the current use of the word “Sawyer”. The views expressed in the examples do not represent the views of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us your feedback. Finally, the “manifestly wrong” standard is achievable. As in McCleskey v. Zant, the standard of clear error is “defined in case law [and] assigned to the federal courts.

The standard is objective and can be applied in a manner consistent with the threshold for abuse of the written survey. 499 U.S., at page 496. Federal courts have long applied the “patently erroneous” standard set out in Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have done so “in civil suits for non-compliance, conviction proceedings, copyright claims [and] forfeiture actions for illegal activities.” 1 S. Childress & M. Davis, Standards of Review § 2.3, pp. 29-30 These requirements are best met by a norm that states that an accused is “innocent of the death penalty” only if his death penalty is manifestly flawed. This standard covers several types of errors. A death sentence is manifestly erroneous if, having regard to all available evidence, the convicted person did not have the legal authority to impose such a sentence because the accused was not liable to the death penalty under state law.

Similarly, in the case of a “jury waiver,” a death sentence is manifestly erroneous if, having regard to all the evidence, the evidentiary requirements for that waiver (as defined by state law) have not been met. See, for example, Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166,1194-1195 (CA111991) (Tjofiat, C. J., partly dissenting) (concluding that conviction “could not have lawfully sentenced the applicant to death” because there was insufficient evidence to meet the jury`s standard of derogation set out in Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)). A death penalty is also manifestly unacceptable if, in the light of all the evidence, mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances to such an extent that no reasonably convicted person would have imposed the death penalty.

See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 et p. 307, 316-318 (1979). Such a situation could arise if a constitutional error prevented the accused from proving that there were no aggravating factors or prevented the convicted person from considering significant mitigating circumstances.  To investigate whether a crime fits this description, we generally use “a formal categorical approach,” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990);  Fiore, 983 F.2d to 3, which means that we only look at the legal definition of the crime, not the particular facts underlying the conviction.

  The Government contend that we have already carried out such an analysis for the crime at issue in the present case and underline our view in Fiore that a conviction for burglary and trespassing on a business structure, such as burglary of a house, falls under the heading of “violent crimes”.2 Sawyer offers two answers: first, this case differs from Fiore;  and second, that Fiore should be dropped as a guide for non-residential burglaries. The Court itself has recognized that “the concept of `real` innocence, as opposed to `legal`, cannot be easily translated in the context of an alleged error in the sentencing phase of a trial for a capital crime.” Smith, 477 U.S., at 537. However, without being intimidated by its own illogicality, the Court adopted such an approach in Smith. There, the court was confronted with the allegation that Smith`s introduction of incriminating testimony when he was convicted by a court-appointed psychiatrist violated the Fifth Amendment because Smith had not been informed that his testimony could be used against him or that he had the right to remain silent and have a defense attorney present. Although the Court accepted the validity of Smith`s Fifth Amendment request 1 and recognized the potential impact of jury testimony that the aggravating circumstance of “future dangerousness” was satisfied, see id., at p. 538, it nevertheless concluded remarkably and summarily that the admission of testimony “the jury`s deliberations on the final question, whether the petitioner really represents a persistent threat to society, not a perversion. Ibid. (emphasis in original). Since Michael Smith was unable to prove the reason for his procedural failure and that, in the Court`s view, he had failed to provide substantial evidence that the alleged violation of the Constitution “compromised the accuracy of guilt or penal determination,” id., at p. 539, his request for the Fifth Amendment was not considered and he was executed on July 31, 1986.